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ABSTRACT – This text addresses the phenomenon of so-called fake news in the new 
media ecosystem, namely in contexts of increasing influence of populist discourse and 
action, such as Brazil, the UK, the USA, Italy, among others. It does so by way of some 
characteristics already implicit in the limited effects theory: a) fake news involves, in 
a specific way, the participation of its receivers in disseminating and sharing it; b) 
producers/consumers (prosumers) are involved in contexts of proximity that facilitate 
selective exposure, perception, and memorization; c) these phenomena are joined by 
another (selective sharing): the stakeholders share ideas they agree with more intensely. 
Information bubbles reinforce existing beliefs and predispositions; d) the phenomenon 
is increased in contexts of proximity, be it geographical proximity provided by regional 
media or thematic and ideological proximity shared in online groups. Despite this, 
there is a difference between contexts of proximity in traditional communities and 
mechanisms of propaganda that have a significant level of organization and ideological 
polarization.
Key words: Fake news. Limited effects. Contexts of proximity. Regional media. 
Selectivity.
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Fake news is generally accepted as a new phenomenon 
associated with new technologies and the digital ecosystem. 
However, false new stories have existed for centuries, though they 
have been classified differently: as propaganda, misinformation, 
yellow journalism, conspiracy theories, or unconfirmed rumors. 
Several examples record this recurrence throughout the history of 
journalism: the Timisoara massacre during the Romanian Revolution, 
with its detailed descriptions of the bloody events that occurred 
there, particularly surprised the inhabitants of the Romanian city who 
FAKE NEWS: emoção, crença e razão na partilha seletiva 
em contextos de proximidade
RESUMO – Este texto aborda o fenômeno das chamadas fake news no novo ecossistema 
midiático, nomeadamente em contextos de aumento da influência do discurso e das 
ações populistas, como Brasil, Reino Unido, EUA, Itália entre outros, através de algumas 
características, já implícitas na teoria dos efeitos limitados: a) as fake news implicam, de 
um modo especial, a participação dos seus receptores na sua divulgação e dispersão; b) 
os produtores/consumidores (prosumers) estão envolvidos em contextos de proximidade 
que facilitam a exposição, percepção, memorização seletivas; c) a estes fenômenos 
acrescenta-se outro (partilha seletiva): os stakeholders compartilham com mais 
intensidade as ideias com que estão de acordo. As bolhas de informação reforçam crenças 
e predisposições já existentes; d) o fenômeno agrava-se em contextos de proximidade, 
seja esta a proximidade geográfica e temática proporcionada nos media regionais, seja a 
proximidade temática e ideológica partilhadas nos grupos online. Apesar disso, há uma 
diferença liminar entre os contextos de proximidade em comunidades tradicionais e os 
mecanismos de propaganda com forte índice de organização e mobilização ideológica.
Palavras-chave: Fake news. Efeitos limitados. Contextos de proximidade. Media 
regionais. Seletividade.
FAKE NEWS: emoción, creencia y razón en el intercambio seletivo 
en contextos de proximidad
RESUMEN – Este texto aborda el fenómeno de las llamadas fake news en el nuevo 
ecosistema mediático, a saber, en contextos de creciente influencia del discurso y la acción 
populistas como Brasil, EE.UU., U.K., Italia, entre otros, mediante algunas características 
implícitas en la teoria de los efectos limitados: a) las fake news implican, de modo especial, 
la participación de sus receptores en su divulgación y dispersión; b) los productores / 
consumidores (prosumers) participan en contextos de proximidad que facilitan la 
exposición, la percepción y la memorización selectiva; c) a estos fenómenos se añade 
otro (compartición selectiva): los stakeholders, quienes comparten con más intensidad 
las ideas con que están de acuerdo. Las burbujas de información refuerzan creencias y 
predisposiciones ya existentes; d) el fenómeno se agrava en contextos de proximidad, 
es decir, la proximidad geográfica y temática proporcionada en los medios regionales, 
sea la proximidad temática y ideológica compartida en los grupos online. Apesar de ello, 
hay una diferencia entre los contextos de proximidad en comunidades tradicionales y los 
mecanismos de propaganda con fuerte índice de organización y movilización ideológica.
Palabras clave: Fake News. Efectos limitados. Contextos de proximidad. Medios 
regionals. Selectividad.
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continued to live relatively quiet daily lives, and received news of 
their radical extermination with some amazement. The disinformation 
campaign conducted by the Bush Administration, which enabled the 
US to start the Iraq War (Castells, 2013, p. 232-260), is a more recent 
example, although it took place in a context that was still different 
from the present one. In further studies, it will be worth tracing out 
categories for these possibilities, because the concept,  just like 
populism, covers a diverse panoply of problems. For example, Ferreira 
(2018), citing Wardle (2017), points out an interesting set of types: 
•Satire or parody: not intended to cause harm, but with the 
potential to deceive;
•Misleading content: misleading use of information to frame a 
problem or person; 
•Imposter content: when genuine sources are represented; 
•Manufactured content: new content that is 100% fake, 
designed to deceive and harm; 
•False connection: when headlines, images or captions do not 
support the content; 
•Fake context: when genuine content is shared with fake 
contextual information;
•Manipulated content: when genuine information or images are 
manipulated to deceive (Ferreira, 2018, p. 142). 
It is not a categorization of fake news or misinformation 
phenomena, but rather identifies, in a way that we find extremely 
productive, “different performance repertoires” in fake newsmaking 
that deserve to be analyzed. Zamith et al. (2019, p. 9-10), approach 
the concept in a study on clickbait, in which they argue that this kind 
of title “can exploit sensationalism, provocative content, rumors, 
scandals, tragedies, fake news and even the supernatural, [and] 
aims for spreadability, especially on social networking platforms, to 
reach more people and meet the expectations of a business model 
based on digital advertising”. The same study presents exaggeration, 
deception, speculation, advertising and entertainment as categories 
of clickbait.
Authors such as Gelfert (2018) attempt a phenomenology of 
fake news, requirements for such a definition including the existence 
of false claims devised with a purpose (by design); the existence of 
a mock journalistic statement, that is, the appearance of news; and 
finally the fact that the presentation of false or misleading claims 
as news is deliberate, that is, involving human planning even if it 
includes automated robotic execution. Other authors (Müeller & 
Sousa, 2018; Coady, 2006; Gelfert, 2013; Muller, 2016) insist on a 
distinction from rumors, as something that passes through many 
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people who spread it and which has an unofficial status at the time and 
place in question. In other words, there is a quantitive requirement 
– a number of what we call shares, propagation, or virality – and a 
qualitative requirement for informality. This distinction from rumors 
seems interesting and equally productive. However, under the 
current conditions of producing fake news, it is questionable. First 
of all, the spread, sharing and virality, or the exposure value of the 
news, its potential to attract viewers and followers, are values of fake 
news itself. In addition, new production and reception conditions 
make it difficult to delimit backstage and frontstage, essential for 
delineating a context of informality versus a context of formality: 
the place of speech, the conditions for defining legitimacy. The place 
of speech is essential for recognizing the informal versus formal 
dichotomy. Indeed, the production and reception of fake messages 
is often materialized through social networks in informal contexts 
of collaborative co-production where ascertaining authorship in the 
classical sense is more difficult.
We primarily aimed to deal with the new wave triggered 
by Donald Trump’s victory, thee Brexit referendum, the elections in 
Brazil, and the rise of the alt right,1 identifying some features that 
involve public participation, the customization or personalization of 
shared content in proximity contexts, and selectivity in reception and 
sharing. We do not believe that this will exhaust the fake news issue, 
but it is intended to identify some traits that deserve reflection.
The fake news associated with the new digital ecosystem2 
involves the participation of its recipients in its dissemination and 
dispersal. It results from a radically new attitude towards audiences 
that has emerged in recent years, coupled with the expansion of 
new digital technologies, social media and user-generated content 
(Fishkin et al., 2015, p. 1030).
Active advocates of this new paradigm, authors such as 
Rosen (2006, June 30), have expressed their belief that changes in 
the relationship between journalists and audience have involved 
a shift from the old one-to-many broadcasting system to a many-
to-many conversational system. Obviously, these changes have 
included social media, online commenting systems, new distribution 
channels, a new model in which consumption itself is no longer 
separate from production, which has been joined by blog platforms, 
storytelling platforms, and calling services that are simultaneously 
social networks like WhatsApp.
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2 The fake news and effects theory: exposure, perception, 
memorization and sharing
Prosumers (McLuhan & Nevitt, 1972; Tofler, 1980) are involved 
in proximity contexts that facilitate selective exposure, perception, 
memorization, and sharing. As canonically established in the literature, 
the limited effects theory that defined these concepts above coincided 
with the 1940s to 1960s and culminated with Klapper’s work, “The Effects 
of Mass Communication”, a kind of summary of the works by Katz & 
Lazarsfeld (1964). According to the established hypothesise, responses 
to a media message are mediated and influenced by interpersonal 
relationships within the group. The overall result cannot be attributed 
to individuals alone. It derives from the network of interactions that 
take place between people. Media effects are the result of a process of 
personal influence, which involves pre-existing beliefs in the group. In the 
book Personal Influence: “The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass 
Communication”, a “law” of selective memorization was identified: not 
only did people expose themselves to media content selectively, but they 
perceived it selectively too, and they tended to memorize essentially the 
information that best suited their ideas (Klapper, 1960, p. 10-11).
Selective exposure demonstrates only that people are more 
easily exposed to news they agree with. The hypothesis made an 
appearance in the limited effects theory, centering on the repeated 
belief that people who did not expose themselves to messages 
contradicting their beliefs entrencehed their opinion (Klapper, 1960). It 
is often used in political communication to explain why certain kinds 
of electoral rituals (rallies, campaign newspapers, etc.) end up being 
essentially directed at mobilizing supporters. Stroud (2010, p. 555-
556) points out that there is evidence that selective party exposure 
leads to polarization and there is a related symmetrical phenomenon: 
polarization can lead to partisan political commitment and thus 
selective exposure. Today, the phenomenon, rather than being an 
example of the existence of limited effects, can be viewed as an 
inducer of media effects around the concept of polarization, especially 
introduced by the Internet, which is seen as producing intolerance and 
extreme viewpoints (Sunstein, 2009, pp. 2-3; Stroud, 2010, p. 556). 
Selective perception only demonstrates that individuals 
are especially predisposed to perceive what they are accustomed 
to or to perceive whatever is most convenient for them in terms of 
obtaining some social or physical gratification. Members of the public 
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“are covered and protected by existing predispositions, selective 
processes, and other factors” (Klapper, 1960, p. 247).
Selective memorization consists of forgetting or memorizing 
part or all of the message, and concerns acquired predispositions. 
Levine & Murphy (1943 as cited in  Kappler, 1960)3 presented a study 
that seemed to pre-announce many others of the Cold War, which 
consisted of distributing material classified as being pro-communist 
to five colleagues with communist tendencies and five colleagues 
wieth anti-communist tendencies. During the period followinge 
contact with the documents, several tests were carried out. Those 
with a more unfavorable position were found to eincreasingly forget 
what they had read, while those who had a position consistent with 
the texts took longer to forget (as cited in Klapper, 1960, p. 26).
3 Media, platforms and attitudes
The so-called limited effects theory has been applied to 
small groupse, as is well known. However, early one, the hypothesis 
was posed that reinforcement of prior beliefs was rather a powerful 
cognitive effect. It is possible to resumee research by Katz & 
Lazarsfeld (1964) for the fragmented proximity contexts of the 
digital ecosystem. But (as some authors have argued even in relation 
to the beginnings of the theory) the existence of previous beliefs and 
assumptions does not serve as a filter in relation to media effects, 
but rather as an echo chamber. This is not exactly new, but it is 
an undervalued and less questioned aspect that has become more 
evident in social network discussion groups, chats and feeeds.
Noelle-Neumann (2009, p. 154-155) had already warned 
that even in the “golden years” of limited effects, there were studies 
refuting the idea of filter and the concept of limitation, demonstrating 
that groups tend to exercise strong social control over their members 
and amplifying the strength of their beliefs by alignment with the 
media. That is, the media confirmed the group’s presuppositions, and 
the groups, in turn, amplified those that were adapted to the group’s 
internal way of thinking. The classical orthodoxy of limited effects 
itself enshrined in the works of Katz and Lazarsfeld and synthesized 
in Kapperjá had come to the same conclusion, though placing it in 
a secondary and almost hidden position in the numerous reports 
it produced (Noelle-Neumann, 2009, p. 155). However, as groups 
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were seen as a filtering element of media effects taken as full, it was 
not clear that reinforcement itself could be, on the basis of diverse 
cognitive assumptions, considered a powerful effect.
A large number of studies, some carried out in the laboratory 
and others in the social world, indicate that persuasive mass 
communication functions more often as a reinforcing agent 
than as a change agent. Within a given audience exposed to 
specific communications, reinforcement or at least constancy 
of opinion is typically discovered as the dominant effect made; 
small change, such as small change in the intensity of opinion, 
is the second most common effect; and conversion is typically 
the rarest effect. (Klapper, 1960, p. 15).
Finally, Gitlin (2002, p. 110-114) considered that the 
behavioral assumption of a short-term effects-centered psychology 
served to measure electoral or advertising campaigns, but disregarded 
longer-term, more complex cognitive effects (as Lazarsfeld himself 
admitted in footnotes in his articles).
Gitlin later criticized proponents of the limited effects theory, 
namely Klapper, for considering reinforcement as a minor matter. In 
fact, “reinforcement is an indispensable element between attitudes and 
actions”, “a configuration (…) that determines in an important way how 
people perceive or respond to new situations” (Gitlin, 2002, p. 116).
In a global dynamics of attitude formation that involves the 
intervention of interpersonal group relations, the global effect of 
messages proceeds in three directions: an activation effect (which 
transforms latent trends into actual ones), a reinforcing effect (which 
preserves decisions made, avoiding changes in attitude) and a 
conversion effect (limited, however, by the fact that those who are 
most attentive and exposed to election campaign messages are also 
those who have the most structured attitudes while those who are 
the most undecided are those who least consume the messages).
This element was taken into account when closed agendas 
emerged around groups that have similar thoughts, which seems 
to contradict the democratic idea of expanding the agenda. The 
new ecosystem makes it possible to place a new emphasis to 
information that coincides with their previous beliefs, so that media 
effects translate primarily into reinforcement. Preference-based 
reinforcement is produced by three related phenomena:
a) The motivation among media platforms to funnel information 
to ideologically fragmented audiences (Maddow, 2010) or even to 
specific individuals as in the case of social media (Scheufele & Nisbet, 
2002) with a view to creating more attractive advertising environments;
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b) The tendency among audience members not only to select 
and interpret information consistent with previous beliefs, but also to 
rely on very endogenously selected online social networks, which are 
often compared to echo chambers (Sunstein, 2009), that still further 
narrow the range of subjects available and their interpretation;
c) With networks comes a new interface between media and 
audiences, such as the results provided by search engines (Ladwig et 
al., 2010) or by personalized news aggregators that drive more and 
more information, that is, information increasingly chosen according 
to the group’s previous assumptions.
Over time, we are increasingly witnessing the emergence of 
numerous issues in which the hybrid construction of public debate manifests 
itself, as it ewith euthanasia, gay marriage, and numerous immigration 
matters. Generally triggered by news and media events: news sharing and 
dissemination take place simultaneously through traditional and social 
media, putting increasing pressure on debate and legislative production. 
However, while the combination of political and communication elements 
with regard to these issues demonstrates how the formation of public 
opinion in a hybrid system has changed considerably, there are still, within 
these intricate communication flows, media organizations and powerful 
political actors who have influence, even if it is occasionally flanked by 
the disintermediation of traditional gatekeepers (Splendore, 2018, p. 409; 
Barisione & Ceron 2017, p. 77). Themes are characterized by a high level 
of polarization. This polarization is not only caused by social media, but 
by the multiplication and fragmentation of media channels (Boxell et al., 
2017). Finally, the polarization of opinion (for and against vaccination, 
for and against immigration, etc.) does not, in the end, correspond to 
the need for the stories that circulate in the media to become simplified, 
projecting yet another arena of games, of gains and losses, of failures 
that produce scandals, than a true deliberative discussion (Gurevitch et 
al., 2009, pp. 172; 175).
Recently, it was found (Splendore, 2018, p. 417; Ferreira, 2018, 
p. 1429) that many of the messages that abound on social networks 
reflect agendas of groups that narrow the range of topics and angles 
from which those themes are addressed, leading to ethnonationalism, 
populism, and the polarization and grouping of political life.
For example, debates such as those surrounding Ius Soli (the 
law that attributed Italian nationality to those born in Italy or to children 
who completed their school education in Italy) were the final straw that 
triggered a complex political process between the Center-Left and the 
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Five Star Movement4 in that country, which resulted in strengthening 
the leadership of opinion by the latter and was associated with protest 
movements that particularly mobilized people on the street and social 
movements, with a vast use of digital media.
The situation created led Prime Minister Paolo Gentilone to 
postpone the debate, since adequate conditions were not met for it to 
be held. Interestingly, the decision was presented as a victory of the 
people, as was announced by the opposition, and Salvini5, through 
social networks, was the protagonist in claiming victory for the 
Northern League and all those who intervened online. The opposition 
turned out to be particularly well orchestrated by parties that did not 
support the law, which flooded their networks with news of foreign 
crime, against an emotional and dramatic backdrop. In June 2017 
there were at least 217,000 public tweets and posts on the topic, 
most of which appeared on the opening day of the parliamentary 
debate, with over 60% of comments being negative, especially the 
result of a media storm around #NOiussoli (no to the law of the 
right to nationality) (Splendore, 2018, p. 412). Fake news came to 
the center of the debate, especially as it emerged as a strategy of 
delegitimizing opponents. Many of the fake news stories were not 
about the law, but about the law’s supporters, attributing to them 
characteristics that hurt their credibility.
In the case of Brazil, recent studies (Ferreira, 2018, p. 139) 
find two fundamental pieces of data: the capacity for emobilization 
(engagement) of fake news is up to three times greater than for traditional 
media content and, in the case of the two highest rated candidates in 
surveys and opinion pollse, on opposite sides of the spectrum, false 
content accounts for more than half of engagement and mobilization, 
with Bolsonaro and Haddad reaching higher relative values.
In the UK, prior to the Brexit referendum, out-of-context or 
simply false arguments about the costs of refugees’ entry or stays or 
their weight in the welfare system, driven by an anti-Europe crusade 
by tabloids such as The Sun and the Daily Mail, influenced the debate 
and its outcome (Harding, 2017 as cited in Ferreira, 2018)6.
Contrary to what one might think, Portugal, although not 
attracting the same attention as the United States, the UK, Italy 
and Brazil, is not immune to the phenomenon, and is constantly 
associated with the mobilization of news values related to inversions, 
scandals and transgressions that arouse attention for hurting social, 
moral or ideological beliefs.
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For example, a case that revolted Portuguese people in late 
2017 was based around a video of a man pushing a second homeless 
man into a dustbin.7 This content quickly spread online and was even 
presented by some media as news. However, some pointed out that 
the information availabele was “scarce and unreliable”.8
Something similar happened during the summer of 2017, at a 
time associated with the fire crisis in Pedrógão Grande, in the district 
of Leiria. Word spread Antonio Costa’s future as prime minister was 
hanging by a thread, as the Government was being heavily criticized 
for its inability to control that natural disaster. The news story, which 
turned out to be false, was first published in the prestigious El 
Mundo and, afterwards, reproduced by Portuguese media. However, 
no sources were mentioned, notably official sources. Sebastião 
Pereira was the name of the author, but his true identity could not 
be ascertained by the Committee of the Professional Journalists 
Licenses. As for El Mundo, it would clarify the situation by saying that 
eit was a pseudonym9 of a journalist working from Lisbon.
One significant case, as it mobilizes identity issues and may 
be considered the exemplary ancestor of fake news, is the “Carcavelos 
Beach Sweep”, allegedly held on June 10, 2005 (Portugal Day). According 
to media reports, there was a sweep that mobilized hundreds of 
people, who robbed and assaulted anyone that appeared in their path. 
Its definition as a collective robbery organized by young people from 
troubled neighborhoods, similar to a phenomenon allegedly occurring 
in Rio de Janeiro,10 was tacitly accepted. The event caused terror on the 
beach and generated a feeling of insecurity. The vast majority of those 
involved in the sweep were African.
On July 7, Diana Andringa, journalist at RTP and former 
President of the Union of Journalists, interviewed the commander 
of the Public Security Police’s Metropolitan Command of Lisbon, 
Oliveira Pereira, who said that “there was no sweep in the sense of an 
organized group that swept along the beach”. Oliveira Pereira added: 
“I knew this about an hour later. However, when I wanted to make a 
transmission to clarify the statement, I never managed to”.
We recover another case, which began in 2010 and focuses on 
a central issue for a certain definition of Portuguese identity structured 
around religion and Fatima. “There are complaints of dog mistreatment 
in Fátima”, the Diário de Notícias newspaper reported, due to the alleged 
poisoning of the animals right at the Fátima Sanctuary (Carmo, 2010, 
May 28). At the time, several photos circulated online that attested to 
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the truth of the story, and a Facebook group was even set up for this 
cause called “Scandal at the Fátima Sanctuary (Killing Innocents!)”. Still, 
it was not clear whether the reported inecidents had actually happened. 
This issue was repeatedly returned to over the years, until in 2016 
the Jornal de Leiria newspaper decided to investigate (Boato de maus 
tratos, 2016, May 20). This led to the matter being declared as false – 
by those responsible for the Sanctuary – and to a journalistic project 
that allowed not only contextualized, but also clarified. “The details of 
the news story/rumor are almost always the same: allegedly someone 
unspecified would have seen something, and journalists would have 
been barred when they intended to report on alleged mistreatment 
and caged dogs”, the regional newspaper stated. The new information 
brough was about the origin of the propagation phenomenon: a blog 
called Além Douro Digital11 that declared itself to be about “information 
from the northern region of Portugal”.
Fake news has been systematically used as a space of 
intervention in the power struggle. One of the images that circulated 
quickly on social networks shows Catarina Martins, leader of the 
Left Bloc, a party associated with the current Portuguese left-wing 
parliamentary majority, with a circle drawn around her wrist. The 
picture states that she has a luxury Swiss watch worth 20.9 million 
euros. The watch cannot be not seen and despite the Left Bloc saying 
that the news is “absolutely false”, the first posting of the image on 
Facebook resulted in 875 shares.
Following this case, the Diário de Notícias (DN) named and 
identified several Portuguese websites publishing this type of content, 
all based in Canada (Pena, 2018, October 21). They share the same 
IP address and the newspaper found a company that specializes in 
“website creation and maintenance, redesigns for existing wesbites, 
page development in a professional and engaging environment, 
search engine optimization”. It is called Forsaken and its owner also 
supports Trump and Bolsonaro. It was there, for example, where the 
Left Block leader’s watch image was created.
In Portugal, the image was published on the website Right 
Politics. Through the Right Politics’ IP address, DN got to its registration 
in Canada at H3E Montreal, Quebec, at iWeb Technologies. The same 
IP address is shared by websites such as The Voice of Reason (A 
Voz da Razão), We Don’t Want A Left Government In Portugal (Não 
Queremos Um Governo de Esquerda em Portugal), Fun Video, and 
Speeding Up. In Santo Tirso, the computer company Forsaken also 
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shares the same IP address. Set up in 2014, the company is connected 
to only one name: João Pedro Rosas Fernandes. The DN reveals that 
all the fake websites and newsgroups are linked to Portugal on the 
Web, referred to on a website called Fun Video, the owner of which 
is João Fernandes. He justifies the spread of lies by his convictions: 
“Unhappy with the lack of opposing views that existed in the media”, 
he decided to set the political page, “but also to publicize acts of 
corruption” (Pena, 2018, October 21).
He also declared himself a supporter of Trump and 
Bolsonaro, “not only for their ideals, but above all because they fight 
against political correctness and vested interests”. According to the 
investigation, the website has as its “targets” João Galamba, at the 
time a Socialist Party MP, João Gomes Cravinho, Minister of Defense, 
Maria Flor Pedroso, Director of RTP, António Costa, Prime Minister, 
Azeredo Lopes, former Minister of Defense, and Jerónimo de Sousa, 
Secretary General of the Portuguese Communist Party, among others.
At the same time, one of the most successful fake news 
sites in Portugal is called Firefighters 24 (Bombeiros 24), but anyone 
searching for this name on Google finds an ad for a fake service: “24 
hour firefighters”. If you click on the link instead of an SOS line or a 
contact, one will find only one website (Pena, 2018, November 11). 
The page managed to have more than 939,000 shares of its texts 
on Facebook during the month of October 2018. On Facebook, the 
page has an even more misleading name, Portuguese Firefighters, 
and has almost 300,000 followers, not necessarily ideologically 
polarized sectarians. Firefighters 24 and its counterpart Portuguese 
Firefighters act as a fake crime newspaper. In their links, several 
people “lose their lives”, others are caught trafficking drugs, others 
disappear, others pretend to “have cancer”, there are tortured and 
asphyxiated cats, and abused children in hospitals” (idem). According 
to the DNe, the website’s IP address is registered in France on the 
OVH SAS server in Roubaix. It has an account open with Google’s 
advertising services. The US company does not disclose the contacts 
or identity of its customers. The same manager of this Portuguese 
website receives, through the same account, advertising money for a 
second Portuguese site called Bilbiamtengarsada, which has 286,000 
followers on Facebook alone. It is both a means of replicating the 
misinformation of the fake fire brigade page and a lucrative funding 
system for the owners of both websites.
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Figure 1 – Some Portuguese fake news sites and their likes 
on Facebook.
Source: Diário de Notícias (Pena, 2018, November 11)
Analyzing the technique associated with the business model, it 
is possible to identify that the website Firefighters 24 spreads a specific 
type of malicious software on its visitors’ computers – an affiliate, 
which allows site administrators to receive money from online sales 
companies. The website leaves a cookie on readers’ computers, which 
then become linked to Firefighters 24. When that person uses that 
computer to, for example, buy something from Amazon, the American 
company learns that its sale was “suggested” by the Portuguese 
website and pays it a commission (Pena, 2018, November 11).
Despite these circumstances, a nationwide study conducted 
by Eurobarometer between November 8 and 19, 2018, shows that 
less than half of Portuguese people (48%) say they are able to identify 
misleading or fake news, while the EU average is 58%. The European 
Commission considered this situation “worrying”, as 2019 was a year 
in which three electoral acts were to be held in the country – European 
elections, Madeira regional elections and general elections.
While it is true that the epistemological status of journalistic 
truth has always been an open topic, since Lippman (Ekström, 2002; 
Godler & Reich, 2016), the emergence of this phenomenon has brought 
particularly complex implications, not least because the debate about 
the authority of journalism and the existence of fake news has involved 
actors who were part of the journalistic field, academics and bloggers. 
Facebook announced that the network would introduce new tools to 
curb the proliferation of false information. Following an investigation 
by Buzzfeed, Facebook even blocked several pages, showing the 
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importance that networks had in the phenomenon (Splendore, 2018).
Alongside the expansion of agendas brought about by new 
social movements, digital media are identifying models for identifying 
themes supported by premodern forms of sociability such as digital 
hooliganism, bullying, and flaming.
Often there is even a process that culminates in reinforcing 
a scarce number of hegemonic themes, mutually enhanced through 
social narratives that gain a transmedia dimension. In many cases, the 
open network acts as a space for dissemination and interaction between 
government officials or organic activists and citizens, but also as a tool 
deliberately directed at mainstream media at the same time as users, 
generating a mutually reinforcing effect that favours publicity techniques 
appreciated by public relations because they involve different stakeholders.
This corresponds to an increasingly sophisticated segment 
bias on the audience side. It is not certain that the democratic 
expansion of agendas is the only virtuous consequence of new 
media. Alongside this expansion of agendas and the debate 
around them, they are also minimized as a result of the basic 
identification of easily understandable and repeatable elements; it 
is known that some movements and political actors are fascinated 
with microblogging platforms such as Twitter or closed groups on 
Facebook or, more often, on WhatsApp. A social network activist or 
populist leader seeking legitimacy does not employ discursive logic 
but rather resorts to oratory expositions, which could be called a 
flow of ideas. The relationship between assumptions and inferences 
is replaced by a linking of ideas that rest on mere resemblance, 
often through association, employing the same characteristic word 
in two propositions that are not logically related. This method not 
only avoids the control mechanisms of rational examination, but also 
makes it psychologically easier for the listener to follow. Of course, 
it is easy and appealing to make them resonate and amplify them.
In this sense, just as group members better handle, perceive, 
and memorize messages they agree with, they also share messages 
they agree with more readily. We may call this effect selective sharing.
4 Fake news and proximity contexts
Feke news connects with the concept of proximity. Proximity 
is usually valued positively, understood as an advantage arising from 
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the possible aptitude for business models and citizenship styles 
based on a close relationship with publics and market segments that 
enable the creation of specific or autonomous scheduling processes 
by journalists. Virtuous proximity is a proximity that can be felt 
in the relationship with interactivity and in changing the model of 
relationships with the public: public, civic, online, web journalism or 
proximity  online journalism (Jerónimo, 2015) are part of an identical 
search for a new form of relationship with the public.
However, on the other hand, proximity can be understood as 
an anachronism, indifferent to cultural, economic and technological 
transformations and which, due to the institutional dependence of primary 
definers (Hall, 2002), makes it impossibele to form an autonomous agenda.
Several surveys have shown that upbeat and “happy” 
discourses about new modes of relationship with audiences do not 
actually corresepond to journalistic routines, at least in terms of high 
expectations regarding interactivity (Lewis et al., 2010).
Thus, fake news in the current context also appears to be 
associated with forms of anachronistic populism that manifest themselves 
in an attitude of support for a cause rather than pursuit of information.
Taggart (2004, p. 274) introduced the idea of an idealized 
conception of the community. Typically, this imaginary territory has 
no future-oriented utopian potential, but rather seeks to reconstruct 
“what has been lost by the present”. On the other hand, this 
idealization is not based on rational thoughts or historical facts, but 
rather in rooted emotions that refer to idealizations such as Middle 
America (Taggart, 2004, p. 97) or “La France Profonde” or “Authentic 
Portugal” (O Portugal Autêntico). “Usually represented by icons such 
as the Boston Tea Party in the USA, Guy Fawkes in the UK, Joan of Arc 
in France, William Tell in Switzerland, or the Constable in Portugal.
In the regional media, too, it is associated with an idea of deep 
countryside and a “real” country, roots and community that sometimes 
become an obstacle in the effort to hierarchize and direct autonomously. 
Notably, in Covilhã, where Re/media.Lab is based12, local political debate 
became the prisoner of two blogs in the years preceding the local 
elections: Pelourinho13 (which seemed to defend the majority party at the 
Council) and Carpinteira14 (Which seemed to conglomerate opposition 
fringes to the same majority), without any fact-checking, although they 
often had news material of relevant public interest but lacking serious 
treatment. On the other hand, the absence of an identifiable editorial 
officer associated with anonymity easily allowed confusion between 
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opinion and fact, rumor, lie and truth, humor, caricature and news.
Proximity contexts are usually reinforced by the attunement of 
ideas, empathy of feelings, affective ties, and the sharing of common 
beliefs. Thus, they make it possible for the public to dispense with 
verifiability at the expense of plausability and group integration.
Today there is a phenomenon of insistent and deliberate 
lying, and it is found that this lie (in the sense of truly fictionalized 
facts), even when understood and accepted as such, is absorbed by 
the supporters of the protagonist favored by the news as legitimate, 
in a way that reports to mass propaganda. Instead of the drumming, 
the buzz of tweets on mobile phones resonates.
In other words, “if it is not true, it could be”, “if it’s not a Muslim, it 
could be because it’s Arab”, “if the Brazilian deputy antiBolsonaro did not 
stage an escape, he could have done so because he is a liar”, that is, “ if 
it’s not true, it could be” is a type of reaction often detected in supporters 
who reproduce the lie without confirmation and regardless of its 
verifiability. Increasingly, the audience cares less if the information they 
receive is precise and accurate. Using the diverse specialized literature, 
it is possible to verify the prosperous intensification of individuals and 
groups, of their own collective or associated agendas, which now have 
easy ways to distribute out-of-context or false content (Norris, 2011; 
Ladd, 2012; Nielsen, 2014 as cited in Ferreira, 2018)15. The emergence 
of new production and distribution platforms and the fall in credibility 
of the traditional press encourage the relativization of the truth, with 
a direct impact on democratic regimes. Twitter-based research shows 
that fake news publications experience a greater number of changes in 
content during dissemination compared to authentic news, leading to 
the proliferation of cascading information chains, fed by Twitter bots, 
programmed for political misinformation (Müeller & Sousa, 2018).
In a context where the production and work relations in 
newsrooms are not the healthiest, and the conditions of verifiability, 
reproduction and reception change, we are facing something old in 
a new context, which changes its impact. That is, it is “fake news” 
in the sense that even when absurd, the promotion of the leader 
and his agenda overrides the truth or verifiability in their acceptance 
by supporters. It is this submissive or even enthusiastic acceptance 
that ultimately leads to a charismatic power of leaders: lying is part 
of the mission to indoctrinate. It is not just “wrong” or “inaccurate” 
news, it is the result of a context in which the distinction between 
propaganda and journalism is blurred and, is even supported and 
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promoted by supporters of the charismatic leader. The problem is no 
longer a matter of counteracting the truth with a lie but caunteractive 
“my lie” with “your lie” or “my lie is better than yours.”
5 Fake news and populism
It follows from the above-mentioned proximity contexts, so often 
praised for their democratic potential, that they may favor situations of 
manipulation and propaganda resulting from a desire to be part of the 
group, and are, in some cases, associated with the charismatic power 
of totalitarian leaders or the reduction of critical thinking about what is 
understood to be “ours”. Fake news is also associated with a form of 
proximity that is characterized in particular by the absence of critical 
distance. This lack of distancing may arise in pre-modern community 
contexts where regional journalism may become too subservient 
to primary definers, just as it can arise in postmodern communities 
(digital groups) where like-minded thought predominates and news is 
subordinated to ideological proximity without critical distance, becoming 
viral thanks to agreement with the message and not prior verifiability.
There is, however, a striking difference between the proximity 
contexts taken on by regional communities merely related by affective 
ties and the aggressive propaganda mechanisms assumed by highly 
organized and ideologically mobilized alt right organizations, and with 
the intensive use of technologies to produce strategically defineed 
effects. While proximity that is too close to the primary definers is 
already obstacle enough to the exercise of a certain critical distance, 
this is further aggravated when the deliberate process of consciousness 
mobilization instrumentally uses this proximity in a highly personalized 
and profitable manner. The Guardian and BuzzFeed News named at least 
100 websites registered in the small town of Veles, Macedonia, publishing 
false news in favor of Trump, such as the criminal indictment of his 
rival and Pope Francis’ support for the Republican (Tynan, 2016, August 
24; Silverman & Alexander, 2016, November 3). Pages are a source of 
profit for their authors with the Google ad monetization system, which 
pays for each click on a link shared on Facebook. In Portugal, one of the 
best-known cases is CNoticias.net, which although admits that “news 
is created by users”, “is humorous and fictional content” and “should 
not be taken seriously or used as a source of information”, the truth is 
that the content created is very highly shared on social networks. The 
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domain of that website and sharing by users who have closer proximity 
to the recipient, are determining factors for the credibility of the content 
and consequent sharing.
This kind of news results from highly polarized public 
communication among producers of factually false messages, in a context 
of radicalization in which propaganda replaces debate and where premodern 
forms of communication seem to resurface, albeit supported by highly 
developed technological forms. Fake news demonstrates the ambiguity of 
the new methods of communication: despite being new, new forms of digital 
communication reproduce archaic forms of political and communicational 
relationships found in the history of totalitarian propaganda or in 
communities where proximity does not allow for open debate.
Thus, fake news in the current context appears associated 
with forms of anachronistic populism, manifesting itself in an attitude 
of support for a cause and not a search for information. It is therefore 
possible to associate fake news with the particular spirit of the time, 
considering the eruption of social networks and the populism and 
the general mediation crisis movement that accompany this process.
6 Conclusions
We would primarily like to add to this necessarily essayistic 
and exploratory text some hypotheses resulting from the literature 
review and case studies that deserve review:
The relationship between social media and this particular 
style of fake news and the assumed possibility of this relationship 
being enhanced by personalization/customization, which in turn 
reinforces proximity and affinity;
Its profound relationship with diverse contexts of proximity, 
which favor affection, emotion and expressive rationality, with the 
risks arising from a loss of critical distance;
The ease in making these messages, instruments at the 
service of simplifying discourse, closely associated with diabolization 
of the adversary;
The existence of selective sharing behavior, which results 
from a critical rereading of the limited effects theory, leading to 
the existence of propagandistic effects in which prior conviction 
reinforcement is essential for efurther sharing and consequent 
existence of a cascade of disinformation.
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These intuitions do not challenge the need for a careful 
categorization that gathers the various kinds of falsehood that 
news discourse in this context can have: rumor, conspiracy theory, 
defamatory lie, silence, euphemization of responsibility, which can 
hardly be neglected in a study about framing.
Finally, it is clear that this exact behavior profile can be seen in 
disruptive situations: emigration, nationality law, vaccination, euthanasia 
(Italy); Europe, immigration, foreigners (Brexit); invasion of illegal immigrants, 
liberal media conspiracy, anti-elite speech (Trump); anti-corruption discourse, 
gender issues, use and possession of weapons, anti-immigration discourse, 
minority rights (Trump and, above all, Bolsonaro), which can be identified 
in Hungary, Poland, Austria, Germany, France, Spain and, peripherally, in 
Portugal, in disruptive contexts experienced in problematic neighborhoods.
NOTES
1 Contraction of the alternative right, a term which refers to the far 
right faction of the United States and some European countries 
which is characterized by rejection of “classic” conservatism, and 
the defense of white supremacy, sexism, anti-Semitism and rac-
ism in general, focused on an agenda against immigration and 
the inclusion of immigrants as well as a militant attitude against 
alternative policies focused on gender studies and the study and 
defense of alternative lifestyles.
2  Digital ecosystems are composed of companies, people, data, pro-
cesses, things and traditional and/or digital media that are connect-
ed by the shared use of digital platforms. These partner ecosystems 
are created to enable collaboration and develop synergies among all 
the parties involved. Jenkins, for exemple, positions digital media 
around public collaboration and the creation of meaning. Jenkins 
argues that digital media incentivize those actions and give rise to a 
participative culture in which consumers and citizens have a larger 
role to play (Jenkins, 2006; Tussey, 2017, August 21).
3 Levine, J. M., & Murphy, G. (1943). The learning and forgetting 
of controversial material. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 38, 507-517.
4 The 5 Star Movement (stylized as the 5 Star MoVeement; in Italian, 
MoVimento 5 Stelle or M5S) is an Italian movement self-defined as 
a non-party, which emerged in 2009 under the leadership of come-
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dian Beppe Grillo, with the purpose of displacing traditional par-
ties to put ordinary citizens in power and establish direct democ-
racy by using the Internet. Ideologically, the M5S is a very complex 
and diverse party, and is populist, Eurosceptic and anti-systeme.
5 Matteo Salvini is an Italian politician, member of his country’s Senate, 
leader of Lega Nord since December 2013 and Noi Con Salvini (“Us with 
Salvini”) since December 2014. He was also an MEP (2014-2018). He 
currently holds the position of Deputy Prime Minister of Italy and Min-
ister of the Interior. Salvini is Eurosceptic and nationalist, anti-global-
ization and one the far right. He is a critic of the European Union (EU), 
especially the euro, which he has called a “crime against humanity”. 
He strongly opposes immigration and has criticized the mild way in 
which the EU deals with the issue of people seeking political asylum in 
Europe. Together with Marine LePen he is one of the great proponents 
of the right-wing populist movement in Europe, end is responsible for 
campaigns on social networks with great impact against immigration.
6 Harding, G. (2017). Media lies and Brexit. A Double Hammer-Blow to 
Europe and Ethical Journalism. In A. White (Ed.) Ethics in the News. 
Ethical Journalism Network report on challenges four journalism in 
the posttruth era (11-13). Londres: Ethical Journalism Network.
7  “Vídeo de jovem a empurar sem-abrigo para contento gera indig-
nação”, SIC Notícias, December 12, 2017. Retrieved from https://
sicnoticias.pt/pais/2017-12-12-Video-de-jovem-a-empurrar-sem-
abrigo-para-contentor-gera-indignacao.
8 “O que se sabe sobre o video de jovem a atirar sem-abrigo para o 
lixo”, TVI, December 13, 2017. Retrieved from https://tvi24.iol.
pt/sociedade/caixote-do-lixo/o-que-se-sabe-sobre-o-video-de-
jovem-a-atirar-sem-abrigo-para-o-lixo
9 “’El Mundo’ recusa identificar autor de artigos sobre incêndios 
em Portugal”, Diário de Notícias, June 23, 2017. Retrieved from 
https://www.dn.pt/media/interior/el-mundo-recusa-identificar
-autor-de-artigos-sobre-incendios-em-portugal8586294.html
10 Retrieved by Correia, J.C. (2009). Teoria e crítica do discurso no-
ticioso, p. 165. Covilhã: LabCom. 
11 https://alemdourodigital.blogs.sapo.pt/
12 Research project that has the scope of an observatory, laboratory 
and regional media incubator.
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